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 Abstract 
Psychological constructionist theories such as the Theory of Constructed Emotions (TCE; 
Barrett, 2014), suggest that emotions are a constructed phenomenon dependent upon more basic 
factors: core affect and concept knowledge. I test this view by manipulating both core affect and 
accessibility of concept knowledge and examining subsequent emotion experiences. Importantly, 
I draw on both behavioral and physiological stress responses of challenged and threatened states 
to examine cardiovascular reactivity and recovery. While gathering cardiac performance data, 
participants’ (N=34) physiological states were manipulated to a highly negative and activated 
state through the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). 
Prior to the TSST, individuals were primed with an emotion concept (e.g., anger, 
embarrassment). Behavioral measures, as predicted, showed that participants in the anger 
condition made more external attributions. Physiological results, although not significant, 
showed beginning evidence of difference in cardiac performance dependent upon concept prime. 
These findings indicate that, as per the TCE, language can impact subjective experiences of 
emotion. This has important implications in the context of psychological illnesses related to 
emotion, such as anxiety disorders, as well as resiliency and recovery from general stress.  
Keywords: emotion construction, priming, challenge, threat, physiology, attribution, recovery 
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Psychophysiological Responses to Emotion Priming  
Since the rise of modern psychology, the study of emotion has been at the center of a 
controversial scientific debate (for review, see Lindquist et al., 2013). The depth and variety of 
emotions we experience on a daily basis have prompted investigations into the origin, 
perception, and universality of this elusive concept. One class of theories on the nature of 
emotion are basic emotion theories. Theories within this framework posit that emotions are 
marked by corresponding neurophysiological states (Ekman, 1992; Panksepp, 1982). In other 
words, emotions cause physiological states and reactions that are innate and universal across all 
individuals. In contrast, the James-Lange theory proposed during the 19th century theorized that 
emotions were distinct feelings created in response to stimulated physiological changes (James, 
1884; Lange, 1885). This hypothesis, that a particular neurophysiological state was indicative of 
a specific emotion, remained fundamental to emotion theory several years later (Johnson-Laird 
& Oatley, 1992). Much of the general public and scholars alike supported the idea that certain 
emotions could be explained by their more basic and innate responses, although the direction of 
this relationship remains under debate. 
More recently, psychological constructionist theories have expanded on traditional 
theories of emotion and provide evidence that emotions are a constructed phenomenon 
dependent upon a number of more basic factors. Specifically, the Theory of Constructed 
Emotions (TCE, formerly known as The Conceptual Act Theory; Barrett, 2014, Lindquist, 2013) 
posits that emotions are constituted of more basic psychological components: core affect and 
concept knowledge. Core affect refers to physiological sensations with varying degrees of 
valence and arousal. Concept knowledge refers to previous experiences that can influence 
thought processes, beliefs, and actions. These two interact and general affective states are 
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interpreted based on concept knowledge, and this interpretation leads to the subjective 
experience of an emotion (Barrett, 2009; Lindquist, 2013; Lindquist, Siegel, Quigley, & Barrett, 
2013). Emotions are therefore not representative of distinct neurophysiological patterns, nor are 
they products of neurophysiological patterns alone, as basic emotion theory and earlier theories 
of emotion propose, but rather products of complex neural pathways that are formed based on the 
interaction of core affect and conceptual knowledge (Barrett, 2014).  
The research presented here tests the psychological constructionist view and aims to 
understand how conceptual knowledge prompts specific emotion experiences after manipulating 
core affect. Prior research shows that when concepts are made more accessible to an individual, 
their experiences, including emotion experiences, can be altered (Lindquist & Barrett, 2008). 
Access to emotion concepts or lack thereof, impacts individuals’ ability to quickly and accurately 
perceive emotions in others (Gendron et al., 2012; Lindquist, 2006) and acquire novel emotion 
concepts (Doyle & Lindquist, 2018). A second component of our study relies on the 
manipulation of core affect. This manipulation relies on evidence examining the physiology of 
challenge and threat in response to stressors (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). Challenge and threat 
are two motivational states that are theorized to impact how individuals respond to stressors. A 
challenge state occurs when perceived resources exceed situational demands and a threat state 
occurs when situational demands exceed perceived resources (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). 
These two states have been observed to influence common processes such as decision-making 
and social comparison and are marked by certain behavioral and physiological profiles (Mendes, 
Blascovich, Lickel, & Hunter, 2002; Mendes, Blascovich, & Seery, 2001). Further investigation 
into challenge and threat states could provide insight into our subconscious perceptions and, in 
turn, our psychological reactions—especially emotions. 
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We aim to use quantitative measures, generating further confidence in any observed 
trends, to assess emotion experiences. In the following report, I investigate the qualitative and 
quantitative nature of perceptions of a negative, highly activated physiological state as either 
challenge or threat states, as a consequence of discrete emotion concept priming. Furthermore, I 
analyze physiological recovery to determine the extent of their impact and implications to 
resiliency and vulnerability.    
The Theory of Constructed Emotion 
The Theory of Constructed Emotion (TCE, formerly known as The Conceptual Act 
Theory; Barrett, 2014, Lindquist, 2013) hypothesizes that emotions are embodied when an 
individual unconsciously uses concept knowledge to make sense of their core affect. Concept 
knowledge is learned from sources such as socialization, language, upbringing, and other cultural 
factors that could influence subjective perception of the environment. This learned knowledge is 
then subliminally “activated” when sensory and motor neurons fire in response to a stimulus 
(Barrett, 2014). For instance, an individual could perceive an ambiguous figure in the dark as a 
lamp post or a thief (based partly on the environment and partly on previous experiences). This 
in turn would activate different physiological systems, such as increased sympathetic activation 
in the case of the perceived thief. The combined effect of perception and core affect would then 
lead to some emotional experience, perhaps fear or shock in this case. This interaction also 
occurs in the inverse relationship, where individuals may make meaning of their core affect with 
concept knowledge and their current environment. In summary, the TCE suggests that the brain 
routinely uses interactions between the environment, core affect, and an individual’s concept 
knowledge to contextualize an affective experience as an emotional event. As such both one’s 
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physiological state and bodily sensations (core affect) and concept knowledge are key in emotion 
construction. 
Core affect and language. Constructionist theories suggest that affect can have varying 
degrees of valence and arousal and contribute to the embodiment of an emotion (MacCormack & 
Lindquist, 2017). By providing peripheral information such as blood pressure and heart rate, 
affect serves as an indirect representation of central nervous system processes, specifically ones 
that interpret and respond to provoking stimuli. Under this framework, core affect can provide 
neurophysiological information on constantly changing body states. This component is crucial to 
the TCE as high-arousal, low-arousal, and other affective states are interpreted by means of 
concept knowledge, leading to an emotion experience. 
As suggested earlier, concept knowledge arises from various cultural and environmental 
factors. Constructionist models suggest that one such factor, rooted in the concept of emotion 
itself, is language (Lindquist, 2009; Doyle & Lindquist, 2018; Lindquist, Barrett, Bliss-Moreau, 
& Russell, 2006). While languages across cultures may not define emotions in the same way, 
they all possess “emotion categories” that correspond to positive (pleasant) or negative 
(unpleasant) affective states (Lindquist, 2009). Therefore, from an early age, language plays a 
fundamental role in concept knowledge and subsequently emotion perception, by serving as an 
“essence placeholder” cohering together all of the cultural relevant information of an emotion 
category for an individual. The role of language in concept knowledge is evidently crucial to 
emotion perception. Studies demonstrate a link, for example, between language and accuracy in 
judging facial expressions depicting emotion (Gendron et al., 2012; Lindquist et al., 2006) and 
language, in the form of words, helping adults acquire novel emotion categories (Doyle & 
Lindquist, 2018). Furthermore, faces with morphed expressions of happiness and anger were 
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interpreted as being more angry than happy when they were associated with the word “angry”, 
showcasing that having a particular concept in mind can shift perceptions of emotions in others 
in the moment (Halberstadt & Niedenthal, 2001).     
Since the TCE specifically theorizes an interaction between core affect and concept 
knowledge, then if an individual’s concept knowledge accessibility is manipulated (by making a 
concept more accessible through priming), their perception of their core affect and subsequently 
their emotional experience should change.  Lindquist and Barrett (2008) demonstrated that 
participants were more likely to report higher levels of risk aversion when primed with 
conceptual knowledge of fear and manipulated to feel unpleasant, high arousal. Participants’, 
physiological arousal levels were interpreted differently based on the concept knowledge made 
accessible to them (anger v. fear), showcasing that concept accessibility can shift around 
perceptions. As such, it is possible for individuals to adjust how they may perceive high arousal 
states such as stress. To inform the expected patterns and physiological changes of a high arousal 
negative state such as stress, in the context of the TCE, we turn to the biopsychosocial model of 
challenge and threat (BPS; Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). 
Perception and Physiology of Challenge and Threat  
According to the BPS, situations that are goal-oriented produce psychological states that 
are based on continuous evaluations of two factors: situational demands and personal resources 
to meet these demands. Factors such as danger (both psychological and physical), familiarity, 
effort, and personal confidence can affect individual interpretations of situational demands and 
resources. When perceived resources exceed situational demands, the individual experiences a 
challenge state; when situational demands exceed perceived resources, the individual 
experiences a threat state. The BPS suggests that certain physiological indexes and behavioral 
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patterns can be used to discern a challenge vs. threat state. Challenge states are associated with 
greater sympathetic activation, resulting in increased ventricular contractility and cardiac output 
alongside decreased peripheral resistance. Ventricular contractility refers to the rate at which 
ventricles pump blood and cardiac output is the amount of blood pumped by the heart. Both can 
be examined via physiological measures such as blood pressure and electrocardiography.  
Largely, as individuals feel ready to take the task at hand, their body reacts in a way to prepare 
them to tackle the situation – physiologically this means increased blood flow to their extremities 
resulting in the aforementioned conditions. Therefore, one may see increased heart rate and 
blood pressure. In contrast, in threat states, individuals are aiming to conserve their energy, 
resulting in a restriction in blood flow, marked by increases in sympathetic activation but also 
larger increases in HPA activation, thus, causing decreased efficiency in cardiac responses; 
specifically: minimal change in cardiac output, increased ventricular contractility, and increased 
peripheral resistance (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). Here, one would expect to see decreased 
heart rate and blood pressure.  
RSA (respiratory sinus arrythmia), which is heart rate variation during a normal breathing 
cycle, is another physiological measure that can be used to mark challenge and threat 
perceptions. According to Porges Polyvagal Theory (2007), low RSA is associated with 
increased sympathetic activity, increased heart rate, and rapid breathing while high RSA is 
associated with decreased sympathetic activity, decreased heart rate, and controlled breathing. 
Because the BPS suggests greater sympathetic activity for perception of a challenged state, this 
would mean that lower RSA would be associated with perception of this state as well. Similarly, 
as the BPS suggests decreased efficiency in cardiac responses for threat states, a higher RSA 
would be associated with a threat state.  
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An individual’s perception of challenge and threat, i.e. their evaluations of resources and 
demands, also impacts their behavior. For example, when perceiving a stressor as a challenge, 
individuals are more likely to partake in behaviors showcasing more other-focused emotions 
like, anger and even pride and provide more external attributions for their own behavior. This 
includes less perceived control, leading to an increase in blame towards others for their own 
performance or the situation. Those who perceive threat partake in behavior that showcases more 
self-focused emotions, like embarrassment and anxiety, and provide more internal attributions 
for their own behavior. This results in increased perceived control which leads to more blame 
towards the self (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010).  
 Recovery. The BPS also theorizes particular recovery patterns with challenged and 
threatened states. This is particularly informative and important to debilitating psychological 
disorders, such as anxiety or PTSD, as it provides a quantitative measure of vulnerability to 
certain stressors (Brosschot, Gerin, & Thayer, 2006). Understanding recovery from general states 
such as challenge and threat could provide information about which types of stressors have the 
greatest psychological impact and if theses perceptions can be easily manipulated with 
accessibility of concept knowledge, which could open a new direction of therapy. Research 
suggests that the general physiological profile of threat states tends to cause more damage to 
certain biological systems than challenge states. Specifically, those who experience prolonged 
threat responses have increased rates of biological aging based off of measures with telomerase 
(chromosome-extending enzyme). This effect has been directly related to stress-related diseases 
such as hypertension and cardiovascular disease (Epel et al., 2018). Based on this research, it is 
evident that susceptibility to stress can play a role in recovery capability. Blascovich and Mendes  
(2010) define this capability as adaptive and maladaptive states. 
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Adaptive vs. maladaptive states correspond to “physiological toughness.” According to 
Blascovich and Mendes (2010), the distinction between these two states lies primarily in baseline 
levels and recovery. Specifically, adaptive profiles are consistent with low baseline CV (i.e. low 
heart rate), immediate increases in response to a stressor, and a quick recovery. In contrast, 
maladaptive states consist of slow increases in activation over the course of a certain task, 
followed by a slow recovery period (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). Seery (2011) proposes a 
similar model to adaptive vs. maladaptive states: resilience vs. vulnerability. In general, 
resilience refers to successful adaptation in the face of a perceived stressful experience, whereas 
vulnerability reflects lack of successful adaptation (Seery, 2011). Studies suggest that resilience 
arises from evaluations of high resources and low demands, while vulnerability to the same 
stressors leads to evaluations of low resources and high demands (Weisbuch, Mendes, Seery, & 
Blascovich, 2005; Seery, Blascovich, & Weisbuch, 2008). Therefore, based on the 
biopsychosocial model, experiencing challenge and threat could be reflected in experiencing 
resilience and vulnerability respectively. Understanding these two states could provide beneficial 
insight into susceptibility for stress.  
Proposed Study 
To better understand psychological and physiological responses to challenge and threat, I 
will incorporate a study design with roots in psychological constructionist theories (specifically, 
the TCE) by manipulating both an individual’s physiological state and concept knowledge. 
While gathering individuals’ heart rate and respiratory sinus arrythmia (RSA), participants’ 
physiological state will be manipulated to a highly negative and activated state, through the Trier 
Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). The TSST is a motivated 
performance task that has been found to induce increased levels of activation and physiological 
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arousal in participants (Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993; Het, Schoofs, Kirschbaum, 
Wolf, 2009). Importantly, prior to the manipulation of core affect, individuals will be primed 
with an emotion concept (anger v. embarrassed v. two control conditions), a manipulation of 
concept knowledge. We chose anger and embarrassed primes because of their previous link with 
external and internal attributions, as well as challenge and threat states. As such, we predict that 
anger will elicit a more challenge-based perception of the stressor and embarrassed a more threat 
perception. Following the TSST, participants complete a series of self-reported behavioral 
measures to provide information on attributions and emotion states.  
Based on prior literature, I hypothesize that those primed with anger will exhibit a 
challenge physiological profile (increased heart rate and lower RSA compared to baseline levels) 
as well as self-reported affective and behavioral responses (reports of less control and more 
blame towards others). Associated with this will be the fastest recovery time, since resilience is 
associated with challenge states. Likewise, if the embarrassed prime induces a threat state, it will 
manifest according to the threat profile (minimal change in heart rate and higher RSA compared 
to baseline levels) and longer recovery times, as well as self-reported affective and behavioral 
responses (reports of more control and less blame towards others). As discussed earlier, 
vulnerability is associated with threat. 
Methods 
Participants 
 This study is part of an ongoing project with a target sample of 200. Participants were 
recruited through the University’s Introduction to Psychology subject pool and granted 1-3 
credits for their participation. For these analyses, we examine a subset of the ongoing study that 
have cleaned and scored physiological data for electrocardiography for measures of heart rate 
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and RSA, and were in the anger and embarrassed concept prime conditions resulting in 34 
participants (Mage = 19.45, SDage=1.73; 10 female; 20 anger condition).
1 The sample was largely 
Caucasian (82.4%) and first (47.1%) and second year students (29.4%). All participants met 
prior inclusion criteria.  
Procedure  
Participants completed two sessions. The first session was completed either in person or 
online wherein individuals complete a series of questionnaires and an eligibility screening. This 
session lasted for approximately an hour and occurred on a day preceding Session 2, which 
lasted for approximately two hours. 
Session 1. Participants completed an initial survey containing a number of questionnaires 
on emotion experiences, behavior, and attitudes. Participants are also screened for eligibility 
requirements for Session 2. The survey is completed online and can be completed in the 
participants’ own time, or in the laboratory. Following consent, the survey randomly presented 
questionnaires measuring interoceptive awareness (Multidimensional Assessment of 
Interoceptive Awareness Mehling et al., 2012); Body Awareness Questionnaire; (BAQ; Shields, 
Mallory, & Simon, 1989)) , emotion concept knowledge and granularity [Toronto alexithymia 
scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994), range and differentiation of emotional 
experiences scale (Kang & Shaver, 2004)], social phobia and anxiety [Social Phobia Inventory 
(SPIN; Connor et al., 2000), Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation (BFNE; Leary, 1983) and State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970)] and other facets of 
emotion such as regulation [Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (ERQ; Gross & John, 2003)] and 
intensity [Emotional Intensity Scale (EIS; Bachorowski & Braaten, 1994)]. Additional measures 
                                                          
1 Due to inability to match some IDs with their completed session 1 and participant error (not properly indicating 
their SONA ID on the online questionnaire), demographics from four of the 34 are missing. 
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of anger rumination [the 19-item Anger Rumination Scale (ARS; Sukhodolsky, Golub, & 
Cromwell, 2001)], guilt and shame proneness [the Guilt and Shame Proneness Scale (GASP; 
Cohen, Wolf, Panter, & Insko, 2011)], and approach and avoidance measures [the BIS/BAS 
scales as measures of approach or avoidant behaviors (Carver & White, 1994)] are also 
completed along with The NEO Five-Factor inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992).   
 Following the battery of questionnaires, an eligibility screening is completed to ensure 
both participant safety and data integrity. Specifically, participants indicated if they are non-
native English speakers, pregnant, have pre-existing heart conditions, a pacemaker, a BMI above 
33, and/or a had a history of mental health conditions, such as anxiety disorders. If they indicate 
“yes” on any of these, they are ineligible to continue. Additionally, females with irregular 
menstruation cycles were ineligible for Session 2 due to the hormone measures (not discussed 
further). If all eligibility requirements were met, participants were recruited for participation in 
Session 2. Male participants were scheduled based on availability and time slots for the session 
while female participants were scheduled between 7-10 days after the start of their following 
menstruation cycle.  
 Session 2. Following session 1, participants complete a second experimental session 
wherein our target hypotheses are tested. We manipulate core affect and concept knowledge by 
having participants provide physiological measures, a brief encounter with a fake participant and 
a series of self-report behavioral measures). Here, five research assistants, each responsible for a 
different role, were involved in the experimental portion of the study. The “experimenter” had 
the most interaction with the participant, guiding him/her in completing the experimental tasks. 
The “operator” controlled setup and handling of physiological equipment and led the 
manipulation component of the session (see Part 3). The “confederate” was only present during 
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the manipulation. Lastly, two interviewers directed the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; 
Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). Following the TSST, a series of behavioral measures 
are gathered for information on the participant’s perceptions of the task and their emotional state. 
 Part 1: Intake screening. Before beginning the experimental tasks, participants 
completed an initial screening given by the experimenter. This screening confirms participants 
eligibility to participate following adherence to instructions provided the day before and to 
document any factors that could affect physiological data. For instance, if the participant had 
consumed/used any caffeine, alcohol, nicotine, toothpaste, and/or yogurt or exercised within two 
hours before the start of the session, they were rescheduled for Session 2 completion. Likewise, 
if the participant was female and her menstruation had not started 7-10 days before the session, 
she was rescheduled. The screening also noted if the participant had heard any information 
relating to the study prior to their participation or did any airline travel in the three preceding 
days before the session.  
 Part 2: Physiological baseline. Following the initial screening, the experimenter attached 
physiological equipment to the participant measuring electrocardiography (ECG), a blood 
pressure arm and finger cuff which reported measures through the Continuous Non-Invasive 
Arterial Pressure Device (CNAP), and additional sensors for cardiac impedance. All 
physiological measures are gathered with a Mindware BioNex 8-channel chassis. Based on 
previously established research models for physiological data collection, the participant sat for a 
quiet 5-minute period for baseline measurements. Following this, they provided a 1 mL saliva 
sample for hormone measures. 
 Part 3: Manipulation. Once the saliva sample was collected, the participant was 
presented with an affect grid consisting of two dimensions: the pleasantness/unpleasantness 
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dimension and the arousal dimension. The experimenter then asked the participant to mark the 
box best representative of their current affective state. This measure importantly does not use any 
emotion concept words. Just as the experimenter is about to move on to the following task, the 
operator knocked and opened the door and told the experimenter that a previous participant (who 
was actually the confederate) had not been paid for participating in the study a week ago. 
Following deliberation, the experimenter and the operator left the room to obtain “payment,” and 
the experimenter asked the confederate to have a seat in the room with the participant. During 
this phase, the confederate delivered the manipulation in a conversational manner. In the anger 
condition, the confederate stated, “I probably shouldn’t tell you this, but I did this study last 
week, and it made me, like, pretty mad.” This condition will be referred to as the “challenge” 
emotion concept in the analyses. In the embarrassment condition, the confederate used the same 
informal phrasing but used “embarrassed” instead of “mad.” This condition will be referred to as 
the “threat” emotion concept in the analyses. In the heightened arousal condition, the last words 
were replaced with “…and it made my heart beat, like, really fast.” There was also a control 
condition in which the confederate only made light conversation with the participant and did not 
include any emotional or affective language. Following the manipulation, the experimenter 
entered the room with the cash, “payed” the confederate, and the confederate exited the room. 
The experimenter then asked the participant to complete another affect grid, claiming that the 
first one could not be used since they had been interrupted. The second grid was, in actuality, 
given to ensure that the manipulation had no immediate effect on the participant’s emotional 
state; that is, the participant would ideally mark in the same location that they had marked on the 
first grid.  
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 Part 4: TSST and recovery. The participant was then introduced to the two interviewers 
who would carry out the TSST. Following the established TSST model, the participant was told 
that they would be responsible for giving a speech about a desirable job in an area of interest 
(Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993). They were then given a two-minute preparation 
period, wherein they prepared mentally. The interviewers then entered the room and led a 10-
minute interview. If the participant could not speak for the full 10 minutes, the interviewers 
asked follow-up questions following multiple prompts to get them to continue. Next, a 5-minute 
mental arithmetic task involved counting backwards from 996 in steps of 7 was introduced to the 
participant. Any time a mistake was made, the participant was instructed to start again and 
throughout prompted to count faster. Other math tasks were available in the event that the 
participant found the given task too easy or too difficult. The interviewers remained neutral 
towards the participant throughout the 15-minute period providing no feedback other than 
prompting them to continue or restart if any information given was incorrect. The participant was 
then given a 5-minute recovery period once the TSST ended, followed by a second saliva 
sample. Physiological recordings were made for the preparatory, speech, math, and recovery 
periods separately.  
 Part 6: Post-questionnaires and debriefing. Following the recovery period, the 
participant was disconnected from the physiological equipment. They then completed follow-up 
questionnaires in which they rated their experience completing the study as well as the 
researchers involved. Of interest are the Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS; Watson, 
Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a Rate your Experience questionnaire, and Researcher Evaluation 
scale. These questionnaires were given to collect qualitative, self-report data on the emotional 
state of the participant as well as their attributions towards those involved as behavioral measures 
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for challenge and threat states, as well as general affective states. The PANAS provides a general 
measure of positive and negative states that the participant reports feeling. The Rate your 
experience questionnaire includes 15-items in which the participant rates their level of control 
over the task, how unexpected it was, the interviewer’s role in the task and their performance, as 
well as their impressions of the interviewer’s helpfulness, judgment. In joint, these items together 
provide a measure of external attributions or blame that the participant holds following the task. 
The Researcher Evaluation form requires the participant to provide a grade to the experimenter 
and two interviewers on a number of traits including: performance, respect, professionalism, 
enthusiasm, attire, motivation, interpersonal demeanor, helpfulness, orderliness, and overall 
performance. They are told that these grades are confidential and that their boss will look at it 
and take the grade into consideration when granting them their overall grade for being in the lab. 
As a reminder, I hypothesize that those in the anger condition will have more external 
attributions and provide harsher grades to the experimenter and interviewers than those in the 
embarrassed condition. 
Afterwards, a funneled debriefing was given to the participant to ensure they had not 
predicted the role of the confederate prior to or during the manipulation. The debriefing also 
collected the participants’ opinions on the research assistants in the study as well as the study in 
general. Participants were then debriefed on the session and provided with contact information 
for the researchers as well as the university’s counseling services for stress and anxiety.  
Results 
Behavioral data 
PANAS. To assess general affective states following the TSST between the two 
conditions, we computed mean reports of positive affective states and negative states from the 
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Positive and Negative Affective Scale (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Prior to 
computing means, reliability analyses reveal that the positive items had a Cronbach’s α = .79. An 
independent samples t-test revealed no significant difference in positive states between anger (M 
= 33.95, SE = 1.45) and embarrassed (M = 36.57, SE = 2.07) conditions, t(32) = -1.07, p = .29. 
Reliability analyses also reveal that the negative items had a Cronbach’s α = .86. No significant 
differences were found in negative affective states between anger (M = 21.90, SE = 1.48) and 
embarrassed (M = 19.36, SE = 1.97) conditions, t(32) = 1.05, p = .30. 
In addition to the general valence mean scores, I computed means of high arousal 
negative states (α = .79; t(32) = .56, p = .58), high arousal positive states (α = .77; t(32) = -1.08, 
p = .29), low arousal negative states (α = .83; t(32) = 1.27, p = .21) and low arousal positive 
states (α = .67; t(32) = -.68, p =.50). The low arousal positive states included items that could be 
deemed more neutral (i.e., sleepy, quiet) which could be why the reliability is so low. There were 
no differences between anger and embarrassed conditions for any of these states. 
Rate your experience questionnaire. The Rate Your Experience Questionnaire 
contained 15-items asking the participant about their perceptions of the task, their performance, 
and the interviewers. Items indicate how much control the participants believed they had had 
(perceived control), how much blame they put towards the interviewers or task itself, as well as 
their impressions of the interviewers’ behavior. All positively valenced items (e.g., “I was free to 
change the way the previous task went”, “The interviewers were helpful”) were reverse scored, 
so that higher numbers indicate a greater level of external attributions as deemed by more 
negative views of others, lack of perceived control, and more blame on others. Reliability 
analysis revealed a Cronbach’s α= .76 across the 15 items, indicating sufficient reliability. As 
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such, I am confident in computing a mean score across these items as an overall measure of 
external attributions. 
To assess condition differences in external attributions, I conducted an independent 
samples t-test and found that those in the anger condition had significantly more external 
attributions (M = 4.13, SE = .20) than those in the embarrassed condition (M = 3.49, SE = .17), 
t(32) = 2.26, p =.03.  
Researcher evaluations. All evaluation grades were transformed into numbers to 
calculate mean values. Higher values indicated better grades (5=A, 4=B, 3=C, 2=D, 1=E/F). As 
there were two interviewers, to ensure that their grades were largely similar across all items, a 
paired samples t-test was conducted for each item (See Table 1). Overall, there were no 
significant differences between grades for each interviewer except for Enthusiasm, t(48) = -
2.403, p = 0.02, with Interviewer 1’s rating on average being 3.5 (SE = .16) and Interviewer 2’s 
rating on average being 3.7 (SE=.16). This may be due to the task design, in which Interviewer 1 
was involved predominantly in the speech portion of the TSST providing the task and also 
prompting the participant to go on, more than Interviewer 2, who was predominantly in charge of 
handling the math task, including catching counting errors faster etc. Additionally, there may be 
small differences in interviewer expression, tone, and general affect during the TSST. An 
average was still computed of the two interviewer grades to have a single interviewer grade for 
each item.  
A second paired-sample t-test was conducted to examine the difference between 
experimenter and interviewer ratings, since I hypothesized that in general experimenters would 
be rated more positively than interviewers, as interviewers were directly implementing the TSST 
and were neutral in affect throughout the entirety of their interactions. Indeed, I find that across 
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the entire sample, experimenters are rated more positively. For all t-tests and mean values, see 
Table 2 and Figure 1. As expected, experimenters were rated more positively for Respect, 
Enthusiasm, Motivation, Interpersonal demeanor, Helpfulness and their Overall grade. 
Interviewers were rated marginally more professional, which could be due to the task roles. 
To assess the difference in grades between conditions among experimenter ratings and 
interviewer ratings, a series of independent-sample t-tests were run. I briefly describe significant 
differences and expected non-significant differences below. 
Experimenter ratings. When looking at experimenter ratings only, a series of 
independent sample t-tests were conducted comparing grades per item between conditions (see 
Table 3 and Figure 2). In the motivation criteria, those in the anger condition (M=4.65, SE=0.11) 
graded more harshly than those in the embarrassed condition (M=5, SE=0), t(19)=-3.20, 
p=0.005. Similarly, for the interpersonal demeanor criteria, those in the anger condition (M=4.4, 
SE=0.15) graded more harshly than those in the embarrassed condition (M=4.93, SE=0.07), 
t(26.4)=-3.14, p=0.004. Importantly, the overall grade from those in the anger condition (M=4.8, 
SE=0.09) was lower than the grade from the embarrassed (M=5, SE=0), t(19)=-2.18, p=0.04. As 
expected, there were no differences in attire.  
Interviewer ratings. When looking at interviewer ratings only, a series of independent 
samples t-tests were conducted comparing grades per item between conditions (see Table 4 and 
Figure 3). In the enthusiasm criteria, participants in the anger condition (M=3.38, SE=0.23) gave 
lower grades to the interviewers than participants in the embarrassed condition (M=3.93, 
SE=0.22), t(32)=-1.70, p=0.09, although this is marginal. In the motivation criteria, participants 
in the anger condition (M=4.25, SE=0.20) gave lower grades than those in the embarrassed 
condition (M=4.82, SE=0.09), t(27.1)=-2.55, p=0.02. The same pattern occurred for the 
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interpersonal demeanor criteria, with average lower ratings from the anger condition (M=3.75, 
SE=0.23) than from the embarrassed condition (M=4.50, SE=0.14), t(29.72)=-2.81, p=0.009. Just 
as with the experimenter ratings, the overall grade from the anger condition (M=4.28, SE=0.16) 
was also lower than the overall grade from the embarrassed condition (M=4.89, SE=0.08), t(19) 
= -0.218, p = 0.002. As expected, there were no differences in attire and professionalism. 
Physiological data 
Electrocardiography data was cleaned and scored (using Biolab Mindware 3.0.21) in 60-
second intervals for baseline, the TSST-prep, TSST-speech, TSST-math and recovery periods, 
providing minute by minute heart rate. Since we also collected impedance cardiography, 
Mindware is also able to calculate respiratory sinus arrythmia (RSA).2 As my research questions 
pertain to differing physiological profiles as a consequence of concept priming, a series of 
independent sample t-tests were then run through SPSS assessing the difference in heart rate and 
RSA between conditions. 
Mean differences in TSST. First, comparisons of overall average heart rates (Table 5) 
and RSA (Table 6) during baseline, TSST-prep, TSST-speech, TSST-math and recovery between 
conditions were made, in a series of independent samples t-tests. There were no significant 
differences in mean heart rate nor RSA between anger and embarrassed conditions during any 
portion of the task. However, when looking at the values average heart rates for the anger 
condition were slightly higher than those in the embarrassment condition, but not by a 
statistically significant amount. RSA across both anger and embarrassment conditions were 
similar for each section.  
                                                          
2 Note that impedance cardiography of the participants was not cleaned/scored, thus we relied on Mindware’s 
automated scoring for these. Therefore, it is possible that there is some variability in the actual RSA scores than 
what is calculated. However, we believe that the error is negligible for these analyses. 
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Reactivity. As the task includes a negative affect induction, I expected to see increases in 
cardiovascular activity throughout all conditions. However, as a consequence of concept 
priming, I specifically hypothesized that the magnitude of reactivity that individuals experience 
will differ by condition, specifically those in the anger condition will have faster reactivity and 
those in the embarrassed condition will slower reactivity. To assess this, reactivity scores for 
both heart rate and RSA were calculated and examined in two ways. The first, Reactivity A, 
calculated reactivity by subtracting the mean baseline heart rate and RSA from the mean of each 
segment of the TSST, resulting in three reactivity scores, TSST Prep - Baseline, TSST Speech – 
Baseline, and TSST math – Baseline. An additional reactivity score was calculated by collapsing 
across all TSST periods and looking at Entire TSST – Baseline. The second, Reactivity B, was 
calculated by subtracting the last minute of baseline from the first minute of each part of the 
TSST, resulting in three reactivity scores: First Minute Prep – Last Minute Baseline, First Minute 
Speech – Last Minute Baseline, and First Minute Math – Last Minute Baseline. Reactivity scores 
were calculated both ways as both calculations of reactivity scores have been used in the 
literature (Allen, Mendes, & Blascovich, 2001).  
Reactivity A. For all independent sample t-tests for Reactivity A, see Tables 8-9. For 
heart rate, there was a larger change in Reactivity A for those in the embarrassed condition 
(M=11.8, SE=2.3) compared to those in the anger condition (M=5.6, SE=1.7) during the 
preparation period, t(26.2)=-2.09, p=0.04.  Those in the embarrassed condition (M=15.1, SE=2.9) 
had a marginally larger change in heart rate from baseline during the speech task compared those 
in the anger condition (M=9.6, SE=1.7), t(32)=-1.736, p=0.09. No significant differences were 
found in reactivity during the math portion. When collapsing across all portions of the TSST, 
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there were no significant differences between condition in reactivity. There were no significant 
differences between conditions in reactivity in RSA (see Table 8). 
Reactivity B. For all independent sample t-tests for Reactivity B, see Tables 9-10. Those 
in the embarrassed condition (M=9.9, SE=2.2) had marginally more reactivity compared to those 
in the anger condition (M=5.8, SE=1.3) during the preparation period, t(32)=-1.7, p=0.10. There 
were no other differences between conditions in heart rate reactivity or RSA reactivity. 
Recovery. To assess differences in recovery time, I followed the method used by Allen, 
Blascovich and Mendes (2001). Here, the last minute of baseline heart rate is subtracted from the 
first minute of recovery heart rate. This value is then divided by 2 to obtain a threshold in which 
the heart rate is half of the total increase. Then, looking at 20-second intervals of the recovery 
period, I identified when the participant’s heart rate was at this threshold above their baseline. 
For example, if an individual’s first minute of recovery heart rate was 96 and their heart rate at 
the last minute of baseline was 72, the threshold would be 12 ((96-72)/2). Then, I would identify 
the time interval during recovery in which the participant’s heart rate was 84 or lower. 
However, when calculating these values, I found that most of the participants had 
difference values that were negative (meaning they were already at the heart rate and RSA levels 
that were experienced by the last minute of their baseline). This likely occurred due to 
habituation following the 15-minute TSST, i.e. participants grew acclimated to the environment 
and reached baseline rates faster than expected. Only 12 participants had a difference score that 
was great than 0 and not negative, ranging from .65-13.36. As these values are small, I opted not 
to explore the recovery aspect of my hypothesis as it will likely require more advanced statistical 
methods.  
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Discussion 
The relationships between attributions and perception of a challenge or threat state were 
generally supported by the self-report data. I hypothesized that those primed with a concept of 
anger would report more external attributions (as seen through perceived control and blame), 
corresponding with a challenge state. Indeed, based on results from both the Rate Your 
Experience questionnaire and Research Evaluations, participants in the anger condition made 
more external attributions for their performance.  
 The physiological data failed to support my hypotheses, which may be in part due to the 
small sample size. However, when looking at the means of reactivity, there are beginning signs 
of the expected trends. The Biopsychosocial Model predicts increased cardiovascular activity for 
perceptions of a challenge state (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). This trend was observed in 
participants primed with the anger condition, but it did not significantly differ from those in the 
embarrassed condition. Another potential explanation for the lack of statistical findings with the 
physiological data comes from the TCE and the manipulation design. Although participants 
primed with concept knowledge of anger were ideally supposed to construct a challenge emotion 
state and participants primed with embarrassment were supposed to construct a threat emotion 
state, the primes may have led to unexpected emotional states and thus varying physiological 
responses. This actually aligns with the TCE which suggests that individuals can interpret 
situations differently, as well as emotion concepts differently. As such, the manipulation may 
have led to varied emotion constructions dependent upon the individual’s own past experiences 
and associated physiological responses (Barrett, 2014). Also, participants may not have 
constructed an emotion aligned to either one of these constructs if they were unphased by the 
manipulation, or, based on past experiences, have different perceptions of speech and mental 
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arithmetic in general – for example, some reported that they love performing in front of others. 
Future analyses should include responses on the funneled debriefing to see the extent to which 
the manipulation impacted participants’ conceptual knowledge about the TSST.  
In regard to the lack of any differences in RSA reactivity, and values being similar across 
the anger and embarrassment conditions, it is possible that challenge and threat states induce 
similar vagal responses, since both are correlated with increased levels of stress. As such, future 
analyses should include the control conditions to compare the relative reactivity between all 
conditions. 
Finally, we were unable to analyze the time to recovery, thus preventing us from arriving 
to conclusions about resiliency, vulnerability, and their relationship to challenge and threat 
perceptions. Many of the participants had already returned to baseline levels of heart rate and 
RSA. This could be due to habituation. That is, by the first minute of recovery, participants had 
acclimated to the study environment. This does not mean that they did not “recover,” but rather 
return to baseline levels could have occurred earlier on in the paradigm. As recovery has 
important implications for adaptive and maladaptive responses to stressful situations, as well as 
vulnerability to anxiety disorders, it is a concept worth exploring in future studies.  
Overall, even with the small sample size, the behavioral and self-report results from this 
study show support for the TCE and the BPS, in that participants who were primed with anger 
reported having more external attributions than those primed with embarrassment. This suggests 
an expected construction of a challenge emotion state. Physiological trends should be further 
researched to confirm these constructions, including systematic data collection for all 
components of the BPS (VC, CO, and TPR) (Blascovich & Mendes, 2010). Observable and 
significant trends in both self-report and physiological data could help provide vital information 
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about the role of the TCE in the context of perceived stress. This could have important 
implications for treatment processes related to emotion-based psychological disorders, such as 
depression and anxiety.  
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Table 1. 
Paired samples t-test comparing grades for Interviewers 1 and 2 
 
Interviewer 1 
M (SE) 
Interviewer 
2 M (SE) 
t df p 
Respect 4.6 (0.09) 4.6 (0.09) 0.81 48 0.42 
Professionalism 4.8 (0.06) 4.9 (0.04) -0.81 48 0.42 
Enthusiasm 3.5 (0.16) 3.7 (0.16) -2.40 48 *0.02 
Attire 4.8 (0.08) 4.8 (0.09) 1.00 48 0.32 
Motivation 4.4 (0.93) 4.4 (0.12) -1.13 48 0.26 
Interpersonal demeanor 3.9 (0.14) 4.0 (0.15) -1.95 48 0.06 
Helpfulness 3.9 (0.15) 4.0 (0.15) -1.35 48 0.18 
Orderliness 4.8 (0.07) 4.8 (0.09) 0.57 48 0.57 
Overall 4.5 (0.11) 4.4 (0.13) -0.81 48 0.42 
Overall (Compared to research 
assistants) 
4.5 (0.11) 4.4 (0.13) 0.44 39 0.67 
 Note. *Denotes when Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances revealed that equal variances 
were not assumed, so df and t-statistic are adjusted. 
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Table 2. 
Paired samples t-test comparing experimenter and interviewer ratings within individuals. 
 
Experimenter 
M (SE) 
Interviewers Combined 
M (SE) 
t df p 
Performance 4.8 (0.05) 4.6 (0.11) 2.22 45 0.03 
Respect 5.0 (0.00) 4.6 (0.09) 4.11 45 < .001 
Professionalism 4.8 (0.06) 4.9 (0.04) -1.03 45 0.31 
Enthusiasm 4.6 (0.10) 3.6 (0.16) 5.97 45 < .001 
Attire 4.7 (0.08) 4.7 (0.09) -0.12 45 0.91 
Motivation 4.8 (0.05) 4.4 (0.13) 3.27 45 < .001 
Interpersonal demeanor 4.7 (0.09) 3.9 (0.15) 5.19 45 < .001 
Helpfulness 4.8 (0.07) 3.9 (0.15) 5.63 45 < .001 
Orderliness 4.8 (0.06) 4.8 (0.07) -0.14 45 0.89 
Overall 4.9 (0.04) 4.4 (0.12) 4.12 45 < .001 
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Figure 1.  
Means for experimenter and interviewer grades across conditions.  
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Table 3. 
Independent samples t-tests comparing experimenter grades between conditions. 
 
Anger 
M (SE) 
Embarrassed 
M (SE) 
t df p 
Performance 4.75 (0.09) 4.93 (0.07) -1.34 32 0.19 
Respect 5.00 (0.00) 5.00 (0.00) - - - 
Professionalism 4.80 (0.09) 4.79 (0.11) 0.098 32 0.92 
Enthusiasm 4.55 (0.17) 4.50 (0.17) 0.2 32 0.84 
Attire 4.70 (0.15) 4.89 (0.09) -0.18 32 0.42 
Motivation 4.65 (0.11) 5.00 (0.00) -3.20 19 *0.005 
Interpersonal demeanor 4.40 (0.15) 4.93 (0.07) -3.14 26.4 *0.004 
Helpfulness 4.70 (0.13) 4.93 (0.27) -1.39 32 0.13 
Orderliness 4.65 (0.11) 4.86 (0.09) -1.34 32 0.17 
Overall 4.80 (0.09) 5.00 (0.00) -2.18 19 *0.04 
*Denotes when Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances revealed that equal variances were not 
assumed, so df and t-statistic are adjusted. 
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Figure 2.  
Mean Experimenter Ratings in Anger and Embarrassed Conditions  
 
*Denotes statistically significant differences (p < 0.05).  
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Table 4.  
Independent samples t-test comparing interviewer grades between conditions 
 
Anger 
M (SE) 
Embarrassed 
M (SE) 
t df p 
Performance 4.63 (0.14) 4.82 (0.11) -1.02 32 0.32 
Respect 4.60 (0.13) 4.79 (0.10) -1.06 32 0.29 
Professionalism 4.88 (0.07) 4.96 (0.04) -0.98 32 0.332 
Enthusiasm 3.38 (0.23) 3.93 (0.22) -1.70 32 0.09 
Attire 4.75 (0.12) 4.86 (0.14) -0.57 32 0.58 
Motivation 4.25 (0.20) 4.82 (0.09) -2.55 27.1 *0.02 
Interpersonal demeanor 3.75 (0.23) 4.50 (0.14) -2.81 29.7 *0.009 
Helpfulness 3.85 (0.25) 4.18 (0.27) 0.95 32 0.36 
Orderliness 4.75 (0.11) 4.93 (0.07) -1.27 32 0.21 
Overall 4.28 (0.16) 4.89 (0.08) -3.48 26.8 *0.002 
*Denotes when Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances revealed that equal variances were not 
assumed, so df and t-statistic are adjusted. 
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Figure 3.  
Mean Interviewer Ratings in Anger and Embarrassed Conditions  
 
*Denotes statistically significant differences (p < 0.05).  
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Table 5.  
Independent samples t-test of mean heart rate for each TSST section between conditions. 
Section 
Anger Embarrassment  
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Baseline 77 (2.2) 72 (2.9) 1.53 32 0.13 
Prep 83 (2.1) 83 (3.7) -0.13 32 0.90 
Speech 87 (2.0) 87 (4.6) -0.003 32 0.99 
Math 87 (2.0) 81 (3.9) 1.32 32 0.20 
Recovery 75 (2.2) 72 (2.4) 0.71 32 0.48 
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Table 6.  
Independent samples t-test of mean RSA for each TSST section between conditions. 
Section 
Anger  Embarrassment  
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Baseline 6.5 (0.24) 6.5 (0.23) 0.07 32 0.95 
Prep 6.7 (0.24) 6.5 (0.33) 0.66 32 0.51 
Speech 6.8 (0.22) 6.5 (0.33) 0.77 32 0.48 
Math 6.8 (0.23) 6.7 (0.27) 0.27 32 0.79 
Recovery 7.0 (0.22) 7.0 (0.29) -0.14 32 0.89 
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Table 7.  
Independent samples t-test of heart rate Reactivity A (mean for each section – mean baseline).  
Section 
Anger Embarrassment 
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Prep-Baseline 5.8 (1.7) 11.8 (2.3) -2.09 26.2 *0.04 
Speech-Baseline 9.6 (1.7) 15.1 (2.9) -1.77 32 0.09 
Math-Baseline 9.6 (1.5) 9.8 (2.0) -0.07 32 0.95 
Entire TSST - 
Baseline 
9.2 (1.5) 13.1 (9.3) -1.44 32 0.16 
*Denotes when Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances revealed that equal variances were not 
assumed, so df and t-statistic are adjusted. 
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Table 8.  
Independent samples t-test of RSA Reactivity A (mean for each section – mean baseline).  
Section 
Anger Embarrassment 
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Prep-Baseline 0.23 (0.13) -0.02 (0.28) 0.86 32 0.40 
Speech-Baseline 0.25 (0.17) 0.75 (0.27) 0.81 32 0.43 
Math-Baseline 0.24 (0.22) 0.17 (0.21) 0.22 32 0.82 
Entire TSST-Baseline 0.24 (0.17) 0.05 (0.24) 0.66 32 0.51 
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Table 9.  
Independent samples t-test of heart rate Reactivity B (first minute of each section – last minute of 
baseline).    
Section 
Anger Embarrassment 
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Prep-Baseline 5.8 (1.3) 9.9 (2.2) -1.69 32 0.10 
Speech-Baseline 19.4 (2.5) 24.4 (4.1) -1.11 32 0.28 
Math-Baseline 13.2 (1.9) 11.0 (2.9) 0.65 32 0.52 
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Table 10.  
Independent samples t-test of RSA Reactivity B (first minute of each section – last minute of 
baseline).    
Section 
Anger Embarrassment 
t df p 
M (SE) M (SE) 
Prep-Baseline 0.27 (0.21) 9.9 (0.30) 0.49 31 0.63 
Speech-Baseline -0.23 (0.25) 24.4 (0.54) -0.14 32 0.89 
Math-Baseline 0.12 (0.22) 11.0 (0.27) -0.39 32 0.69 
 
 
 
